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Abstract—Nowadays, vehicles have complex in-vehicle net-
works (IVNs) with millions of lines of code controlling almost
every function in the vehicle including safety-critical functions.
It has recently been shown that IVNs are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to cyber-attacks capable of taking control of vehicles,
thereby threatening the safety of the passengers. Several coun-
termeasures have been proposed in the literature in response
to the arising threats, however, hurdle requirements imposed
by the industry is hindering their adoption in practice. In
particular, detecting attacks on IVNs is challenged by strict
resource constraints and utterly complex communication patterns
that vary even for vehicles of the same model. In addition, existing
solutions suffer from two main drawbacks. First, they depend
on the underlying vehicle configuration, and second, they are
incapable of detecting certain attacks of a stealthy nature.
In this paper, we propose CASAD, a CAN-Aware Stealthy-
Attack Detection mechanism that does not abide by the strict
specifications predefined for every vehicle model and addresses
key real-world deployability challenges. Our fast, lightweight,
and system-agnostic approach learns the normal behavior of
IVN dynamics from historical data and detects deviations by
continuously monitoring IVN traffic. We demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of CASAD by conducting various experiments on a
CAN bus prototype, a 2018 Volvo XC60, and publicly available
data from two real vehicles. Our approach is experimentally
shown to be effective against different attack scenarios, including
the prompt detection of stealthy attacks, and has considerable
potential applicability to real vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
In-vehicle security has recently attracted notable attention
as real-world attacks have demonstrated that it is possible
to remotely control vehicles and compromise safety-critical
functions via, for example, the Internet-enabled multimedia
system, thereby threatening the safety of the passengers [1–5].
As early as 2010 and 2011, a group of researchers [2, 6]
demonstrated two unprecedented remote attacks on a General
Motors 2009 Chevrolet Impala allowing them to physically
control the vehicle. In the first attack, they compromised the
vehicle’s media player system by exploiting a vulnerability
in its Bluetooth stack implementation, while in the second
attack, a vulnerability in the telematic unit connected to
the safety-critical network was exploited to send arbitrary
brake messages. A few years later, Miller and Valasek [7]
compromised a Jeep Cherokee through a vulnerability in its
Internet-enabled multimedia system, allowing them to control
the steering, the brakes, and the acceleration of the vehicle.
Rather alarmingly, they showed how this exploit could be
implemented as a worm to quickly compromise approximately
1.4 million vulnerable vehicles. The trend of cyberattacks
against vehicles has continued to date with more major brands,
such as Tesla and BMW, being remotely compromised [8, 9].
Although some automakers seem to have reacted to certain
breaches by issuing over-the-air updates to patch exploited
vulnerabilities, it has been shown that the introduced security
protection mechanisms can be bypassed [10].
The increasing susceptibility of vehicles to cyberattacks
is in large part due to connectivity to the Internet, lack of
secure network partitioning that ensures separation of safety-
related domains from the rest of the network, and lack of
measures to verify the integrity and authenticity of Electronic
Control Unit (ECU) software and communications. In addition,
the communication architectures currently used in In-Vehicle
Networks (IVNs) were mainly designed with no security in
mind. In particular, the Controller Area Network (CAN), by
far the most prevailing bus technology in IVNs, is inherently
insecure and lacks the necessary means of protecting against
message tampering and spoofing attacks. For instance, CAN
messages are broadcast and carry no information about the
sender and thus can be easily spoofed.
To combat the emerging security threats to IVNs, several
defensive measures have been proposed in the literature, which
can be broadly categorized as message authentication schemes
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The maximum payload
size of a CAN message being only 8 bytes makes appending a
cryptographically secure Message Authentication Code (MAC)
to the available space a challenge. Several approaches have
been proposed to resolve this limitation [11–17], however, the
proposed schemes hardly make it to the industry due to the
tight resource constraints in automotive systems, with backward
compatibility and acceptable overhead expectations being the
biggest adoption hurdles [18].
Intrusion detection systems, on the other hand, are designed
to passively monitor IVN traffic for anomalies without imposing
computational overhead on in-vehicle communication. As such,
they meet the challenging resource constraints and strict real-
time requirements of IVNs. In recent years, there have been
several attempts to design and develop intrusion detection
systems for IVNs [19–23]. Due to the long life-span (decades)
of vehicles and the difficulty to maintain regular updates,
anomaly-based detection has been considered to be more viable
than signature-based approaches [19].
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Most previous studies on anomaly-based attack detection
leverage the high regularity of the timing behavior of IVN
messages to detect malicious traffic by monitoring for unlikely
changes in their periodicity. Other studies leverage the subtle,
yet distinctive, differences in the physical properties of ECUs
to detect intruders and identify compromised ECUs [23–26].
Since a considerable portion of IVN messages are transmitted
periodically, and CAN messages are inherently associated with
unique low-level physical ECU properties, existing approaches
are, by and large, capable of detecting attacks that cause such
kinds of deviation. State-of-the-art solutions, however, fall short
on two main fronts.
First, there have been no noteworthy attempts to detect
stealthy attacks that do not cause drastic changes in the
IVN dynamics. Among the most common types of attacks
on IVNs considered in the literature (see Section III-B), the
masquerade attack, where the adversary injects attack messages
from a compromised ECU while simultaneously muting the
intended ECU, is often branded as a stealthy attack. However,
in Section III, we show that the masquerade attack does cause
changes in the overall behavior of the CAN traffic and is
hardly stealthy. This paper introduces a novel, truly stealthy
attack, in which the adversary reprograms the intended ECU
and directly manipulates the payloads of its messages without
affecting the IVN characteristics. We argue that this stealthy
attack is feasible, and potentially as severe as the other existing
attacks. We find no clear evidence in the literature that existing
techniques are capable of detecting this type of attacks.
Second, in most cases, prior knowledge about the underlying
IVN traffic (frame ID, transmission frequency, etc.) and ECU
configurations is needed. This makes the existing solutions
dependent on the underlying system specifications, which are
typically proprietary and may vary in vehicles of the same
model and year produced by the same OEM, let alone in
vehicles of different brands.
In this work, inspired by a recently proposed specification-
agnostic method (PASAD) for detecting attacks on industrial
control systems (ICSs) [27], we propose CASAD, a CAN-Aware
Stealthy-Attack Detection mechanism for IVNs. As IVNs differ
considerably from ICSs, we explain in Section IV how we
leverage PASAD’s underlying theory to develop CASAD for
the IVN domain.
CASAD employs an exploratory time-series analysis tech-
nique to capture the deterministic behavior of the IVN
dynamics by processing CAN traffic at the payload level. The
method works by first identifying a mathematical representation
of the normal behavior of IVNs and subsequently monitoring
in real time for attack-indicating changes in the payload
structure. In addition to being inherently capable of detecting
stealthy attacks on IVNs by detecting slight variations in the
monitored signal, CASAD requires no prior knowledge of the
mechanism generating the CAN traffic. As such, the proposed
technique overcomes the discussed challenges pertaining to the
deployability of such solutions in practice.
More specifically, this paper makes the following contri-
butions: (i) Inspired by an existing technique from a differ-
ent domain, we introduce CASAD; a fast, lightweight, and
specification-agnostic attack-detection mechanism for IVNs
that goes a long way toward overcoming adoption hurdles
imposed by the industry; (ii) We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed approach by conducting extensive experiments
including performing attacks that we designed to serve as real-
world scenarios on a 2018 Volvo XC60; (iii) We introduce
a novel, stealthy, and overlooked type of attack in which
the adversary is capable of manipulating message payloads
directly at the target system while remaining under the radar;
(iv) We show that by monitoring CAN traffic in a way that
the entire stream of CAN message payloads is treated as
a single signal, we require no comprehension of the actual
encoded signals and the underlying vehicle specifications that
are typically proprietary. As such, our approach is applicable
to vehicles of different brands and configurations; (v) We
show that, by identifying malicious manipulations directly at
the payload level, CASAD is capable of detecting strategic
adversaries who ensure that message frequencies and low-level
ECU configurations remain intact under the attack.
After presenting background material and related work
in Section II, we underline the vulnerability of IVNs and
describe attack scenarios in Section III. Section IV presents
our specification-agnostic detection methodology for IVNs,
which we evaluate in Section V. Finally, we conclude this
work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The CAN protocol is the primary target of state-of-the-art
IVN intrusion detection systems. This section lays down the
principles of CAN communication followed by a discussion
of related work.
A. CAN Communication
CAN is a multi-master serial bus with a typical speed
of 500 kbit/s on which many of the operational and safety-
critical in-vehicle functions are implemented. As shown in
Figure 1, each CAN frame has a unique ID that indicates its
priority, determines its source and destination(s), and enables
the receivers to decode its data content accordingly. If two
or more CAN frames are to be transmitted simultaneously on
a single bus that is in idle state, the frame with the highest
priority (the lowest ID) is transmitted first. During this time, all
other ECUs refrain from transmission, switch to receiving
mode, and wait until the bus returns to the idle state.
A single CAN frame can carry up to 8 data bytes of
content, typically consisting of one or multiple signals that
control different functions such as speed, steering-wheel angle,
autonomous braking, indicators, and lamps. The permissible
data content and transmission frequency of each CAN frame
are specified by the vehicle manufacturer in the early phases of
ECU development. For instance, a CAN frame with ID=0x12
and periodicity of 10 ms may belong to the engine-control
ECU, in which case, it would carry data related to the engine
speed and torque. A receiving ECU that is waiting for a frame
with ID=0x12 examines the ID using a filtering mechanism
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Fig. 1: The various fields that make up a CAN frame.
and drops unwanted frames. Due to the strict specification of
the ECU communication, the degree of randomness in IVN
traffic is significantly lower than that of Internet traffic and
classical computer networks.
CAN messages are broadcast and do not carry information
about the sender or receiver, and thus the CAN protocol
provides no mechanisms to verify their authenticity and
integrity. Unlike MACs, which guarantee that the content of a
message has not been maliciously altered in transit, the CRC
field in a CAN frame only enables a receiver to detect bit flips
caused by transmission errors.
To gain access to the CAN traffic in a vehicle, the mandated
On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) physical interface, typically
situated under the steering wheel, is commonly used. OBD-
II is a standardized diagnostic connector that gives access
to various vehicle subsystems, and can be used as an entry
point to monitor or inject CAN traffic [28]. Some ECUs
have a set of service routines that may be triggered during
a diagnostic session by a testing device in order to identify
errors. For instance, it is possible to establish a diagnostic
session to the brake ECU and order it to fully engage the
brakes by sending a request with the associated routine ID and
parameters. This communication between the testing device and
the ECUs is enabled by the Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS)
protocol, which is a standardized diagnostic communication
protocol, commonly used in ECU communication. A wide
range of services are available through UDS, such as ECU
reset, read/write by identifier, diagnostic session control, and
remote routine activation. Safety-critical service routines are
typically protected and executable only under certain conditions.
For instance, an engine ECU may perform a routine to “kill”
a particular fuel injector only if the vehicle’s speed is below
some threshold. In order to unlock such services for authorized
users, a request-response protocol, commonly referred to as
Security Access, must be initiated by the user device. This
protocol ensures that only basic diagnostic commands, such as
ECU reset and listen-only mode, are permissible for
unauthorized users.
B. Related Work
Much of the related literature on in-vehicle attack detection
lays particular emphasis on the well-defined specifications
of CAN communication with respect to message periodicity
and data content. Larson et al. [29] propose a specification-
based method to detect malicious communication that does
not comply with the configuration parameters of the ECU
and the CAN protocol specifications. After identifying eight
potentially exploitable aspects of CAN communication, such
as message frequency, data consistency, and data plausibil-
ity, Mu¨ter et al. [19] propose a sensor-based detection method
to detect abnormal events related to each aspect.
An entropy-based approach is proposed in [20], where the
normal entropy of CAN traffic is initially modelled, and the
entropy of subsequent traffic is then monitored such that a
higher value indicates a higher level of coincidence in the
communication. Since IVN traffic has strict specifications,
manipulation in the frequency or payload of CAN frames
is expected to increase the entropy, and may thus be detected
by the proposed technique.
Based on the assumption that each frame ID can be
associated with only one transmitter on a single bus, Matsumoto
et al. [30] suggest the use of the frame ID to both detect and
prevent unauthorized message transmissions. According to the
authors, an ECU should verify that its own messages are not
present on the bus unless the ECU is in sending mode. If
this is not the case, then it is likely that an unauthorized node
is transmitting the message on behalf of the actual sender, in
which case, the receiving ECU overwrites the message before
the transmission is over.
To detect message-injection attacks, Moore et al. [31]
propose to model the inter-arrival time (or wait time) of periodic
messages. Given that in a message-injection attack the adversary
must send messages with a valid ID at a rate at least equal to
the original message frequency, the proposed technique detects
an attack whenever the inter-arrival time between two instances
of a given message deviates from the expectation.
Distinctively, Murvay and Groza [24] exploit the physical
characteristics of CAN frames (e.g., voltage) to fingerprint
ECUs so as to achieve source detection. The authors argue that
signals generated by CAN transceivers exhibit different patterns,
even if the transceivers originate from the same manufacturer,
due to peculiar differences in their physical properties. A
follow-up study by Choi et al. [25] improves the fingerprinting
capabilities by analyzing more CAN traffic features. In a
similar fashion, Cho and Shin [23] propose to fingerprint CAN
transceivers based on ECU clock behavior. Due to the lack
of clock synchronization in CAN communication, the authors
hypothesized that the clock offset and the clock skew
of each CAN transceiver are inimitable because they depend
only on each ECU’s local crystal clock. Unlike other state-of-
the-art methods, the clock-based technique has been shown
capable of detecting more acute attacks.
Even though the state-of-the-art IVN intrusion detection
systems are capable of detecting many types of attacks, they
suffer from certain drawbacks. In particular, most proposed
methods require prior knowledge about the underlying IVN and
ECU configurations, which may vary even in vehicles of the
same model and year. Although such variety in configurations
enables automakers to fulfill different geographical market
needs, it makes it quite challenging to update the IDS models if
existing approaches are to be deployed in vehicles. Furthermore,
with regards to coverage of different attacks, the proposed
techniques have not been shown capable of detecting advanced
stealthy attacks. We will discuss these detection limitations in
more detail in Section III.
III. ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we introduce our new stealthy attack and
present the various attack scenarios that we considered in our
experiments after describing our adversary model.
The most common way of accessing a vehicle’s internal
network to inject attack messages is through its OBD-II port
(see Section II-A). It is also possible to remotely access and
attack the vehicle through other media such as the Internet,
cellular networks, and Bluetooth systems [2, 7]. The in-vehicle
infotainment system commonly has a CAN transceiver and
provides external networking connectivity and is, as such, an
attractive target for adversaries to gain access to the in-vehicle
CAN bus.
A. Adversary Model
In our experiments, we assume that the adversary has either
local or remote access to the IVN. Furthermore, we consider
the worst possible situation in which a nefarious adversary
aims to influence the vehicle behavior, potentially leading to
immobilization, dangerous maneuvers, or even collision.
Irrespective of the attack surface used to mount the attack,
after having identified the CAN ID of the intended safety-
critical message, the adversary’s goal is to perform one of
the following malicious tasks or a combination thereof: (i)
compromise the original sender ECU (hereinafter referred
to as target ECU) and maliciously manipulate the message
payload before it is transmitted on the bus; (ii) impersonate
the target ECU by injecting the carefully crafted message in
an indistinguishable manner; or (iii) prevent the target ECU
from sending the message by placing it in a listen-only
mode via diagnostic commands.
The cost and complexity of performing these tasks vary
depending on the target vehicle’s hardware, software, and
attack surfaces. Foster et al. [32] experimentally show how
these factors, especially the ECU firmware, affect the ability
of an adversary to inject malicious messages into the bus. In
general, ECUs can be either partially or fully compromised.
Partially compromised ECUs. If an ECU is partially (or
weakly) compromised, the adversary lacks access to its memory
and can only listen to the communication on the bus. A partially
compromised ECU may not be used to inject arbitrary messages,
however, the adversary can forcibly prevent it from transmitting
its normal messages by either putting it offline, or by putting the
transceiver into listen-only mode via basic diagnostic
commands. ECU developers usually implement a set of service
routines that may be triggered by a testing device in a workshop
through a diagnostic session after the routine requirements have
been met. As pointed out in Section II-A, safety-critical routines
are well protected and execute only under certain conditions,
such as the vehicle being at low speed or completely turned off.
Importantly, a weakly compromised ECU may not be used to
trigger or exploit such routines. An adversary may essentially
use a weakly compromised ECU to sniff traffic or shut it down
entirely to cause one or several other ECUs that rely on its
messages to malfunction.
Fully compromised ECUs. By contrast, if an ECU is fully
(or strongly) compromised, the adversary is assumed to have
full memory access and the ability to inject crafted messages
into the bus. An adversary who can fully compromise an ECU
typically has comprehensive knowledge of its software and
hardware specifications, and may be capable of reprogramming
its firmware to add or remove ECU features. Moreover, with
a fully compromised ECU, the adversary may obtain the
Security Access seed/key generation algorithm by reverse-
engineering the firmware to unlock the ECU and exploit its
safety-critical routines. In fact, as demonstrated in recent
automotive attacks [2, 6–8, 10], it is not uncommon for
an adversary to unlock a strongly compromised ECU using
advanced diagnostic commands and bypass (or disable) existing
software protection mechanisms.
B. Attack Scenarios
In the literature, three attack scenarios for in-vehicle net-
works are documented: suspension, fabrication, and masquer-
ade attacks [7, 23, 28, 33], which are considered in our
evaluation. In addition, as one of the contributions in this
paper, we introduce a novel stealthy attack which we refer to
as the conquest attack.
In order to provide an intelligible explanation of the attacks,
let us consider a simple CAN setup (Figure 4a) in which
messages A0, B0/B1, and C0 are transmitted over different
time intervals by ECUs A, B, and C respectively. For the sake
of illustration, we consider B0 to be a sensitive message related
to one or more safety-critical functions, and thus B is the target
ECU in the attacks.
Suspension attack. The suspension attack (Figure 2a) is
a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack, where the weakly
compromised ECU B ceases to send messages. In order to
achieve this, the adversary manages, through a diagnostic
session, to put the ECU into programming mode so that it is
no longer able to transmit messages. As a result, the receivers
that rely on incoming data from the suspended ECU may no
longer function properly.
Fabrication attack. In a fabrication attack, the adversary is
incapable of compromising the target ECU, but is able to fully
compromise another ECU (A) on the bus and use it as a means
to impersonate B. Specifically, A is used to transmit forged
messages with ID B0 at a higher frequency than B so that the
receiving ECUs would receive conflicting B0 messages sent by
both A and B, except that the data received from A would be
dominant due to higher frequency of transmission (see Fig 2b).
Hence, the receiving ECUs would process the payload of the
B0 messages overwhelmingly received from the adversary
and react accordingly, potentially starting to malfunction. A
typical scenario is the transmission of forged speedometer
values at a higher pace than the original message, resulting
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Fig. 2: Schematics for suspension attack (2a), fabrication attack (2b), masquerade attack (2c), and conquest attack (2d).
in the speedometer behaving erratically on the dashboard and
predominantly showing the speed attack values.
For safety-related reasons, some automakers deploy the naive
solution of associating with each message a counter value that
is incremented by one on every new transmission, such that
upon receiving two consecutive messages with non-matching
counter values, the ECU initiates a fail-safe procedure or simply
turns off. Unsurprisingly, it was demonstrated in [28] how it is
possible to circumvent this type of protection and control the
steering wheel of a Toyota Prius through a fabrication attack.
Masquerade attack. As can be noticed in the fabrication
attack scenario, although the adversary impersonates the target
ECU through a weakly compromised ECU, the target ECU will
keep transmitting messages. This makes the fabrication attack
ineffective whenever safety-related protection mechanisms on
the receiving ECUs are in effect. These mechanisms are
designed to identify and react to messages with contradicting
signal values [7].
In a masquerade attack (Figure 2c), on the other hand, the
adversary has the additional power of weakly compromising
the target ECU and suspending it from transmission, while
immediately starting to transmit attack messages (B0) at the
original frequency from a fully compromised ECU (A) on
the same bus. This way, the adversary can bypass possible
protection mechanisms on the receiving ECUs, as the latter
only process B0 messages coming from A and no violation in
the arrival times of these messages occurs.
As a case in point, in order to remotely attack and control a
Jeep Cherokee, Miller and Valasek [7] identified the message
used by the Parking Assistant Module (PAM) ECU to control
the steering wheel. However, unlike the previous vehicles they
had successfully attacked (e.g., Toyota Prius), the fabrication
of the message was ineffective on the Jeep. They observed
that irregularities caused by sending fabricated messages cause
the parking assistant system to get confused and go offline.
However, they managed to get around the protection mechanism
by stopping the PAM from sending its normal messages, thus
switching from a fabrication attack to a masquerade attack.
Specifically, they put the PAM into programming mode via a
diagnostic session and then sent the real message from the fully
compromised infotainment unit instructing the power steering
ECU to turn the wheel.
The masquerade attack is not stealthy. It is worth noting that
since the target ECU is suspended by the adversary, it ceases to
transmit all of its messages (and typically ECUs transmit more
than a single message), including B1; hence ECUs relying on
receiving message B1 may start to malfunction. A masquerade
attack may have impact on ECU A as well, which may become
overloaded in the likely case that it has fewer transmission
buffers than the number of messages it has to transmit. This
in turn would introduce problems such as significant priority
inversion [34] and non-abortable message transmission [35] that
consequently degrade the real-time performance of the CAN
bus. In short, the masquerade attack is not stealthy because it
creates a mess in the CAN communication.
We deem an attack on IVNs stealthy only if it causes no
noticeable changes in CAN communication characteristics.
Evidently, based on this definition of stealthiness, none of the
attacks just described can be considered stealthy, since they all
give rise to noticeable irregularities either in the timing behavior
of IVN messages, or in the low-level physical properties of
ECUs, or in both.
Conquest attack. We introduce the conquest attack, a truly
stealthy type of attack, in which the adversary is able to evade
both the security protection mechanisms and the state-of-the-
art intrusion detection systems. As shown in Figure 2d, in
a conquest attack, the adversary directly conquers the target
ECU by fully compromising it, which in none of the previous
scenarios the adversary was able to achieve. In particular, the
adversary is able to reprogram the target ECU so that instead
of having to compromise another node on the network to
inject the intended malicious payload, the adversary directly
manipulates the payload of the sensitive message B0, albeit only
subtly, thus forcing the corresponding safety-sensitive operation
executed on the receiving ECU to function erroneously. Unlike
all other scenarios we have described so far, this attack causes
no changes in the normal behavior of any of the ECUs with
respect to message frequency, clock offset, or clock skew
behavior. Even at the payload level, a strategic adversary
carrying out a conquest attack alters only a few bytes of
data in a continuous stream of CAN frames. Such a stealthy
attack may prove particularly effective against Advanced Driver-
Assistance Systems (ADAS), such as forward collision warning,
lane departure warning, and electronic stability control, that
critically rely on the integrity of sensor values. Therefore,
performing a conquest attack on such sensor values may
have far-reaching consequences on the underlying IVN if the
adversary manages to maliciously alter sensor data bytes in
such a way that they fall into the normal range, yet deviate
from the actual values received from the real environment. A
possible real-world conquest attack scenario is one where the
adversary is able to reprogram the parking assistant module
and directly send crafted steering wheel angles to the steering
wheel ECU causing the wheel to behave erratically. In another
hypothetical scenario, the adversary reprograms the engine
control module and maliciously alters data bytes in the engine
speed messages in such a way that the speed sensor readings
remain in a reasonable range while not reflecting the actual
speed of the engine. Consequently, functions that make use of
these readings to make decisions based on the engine speed
will be presented with misleading information.
We stress that a conquest attack is a serious one in no small
part because it is feasible, stealthy, and potentially as damaging
as the other three attacks. Furthermore, a conquest attack is not
impractical; as a matter of fact, the currently available tools
and techniques that were used in the most recent automotive
attacks are sufficient for performing this type of attack. As a
case in point, Miller and Valasek [28] were able to reverse-
engineer the firmware of the parking assistant module on a
Jeep Cherokee and obtain its Security Access algorithms and
keys allowing them, in principle, to reprogram the ECU and
eventually carry out a conquest attack.
C. Limitations of Existing Techniques
Both suspension and fabrication attacks may cause severe
impact on the vehicle, but since they cause drastic changes in
the IVN traffic, they are trivial to detect by existing methods.
In a masquerade attack, although no messages are sent at
a higher frequency like in fabrication attacks, the weakly
compromised target ECU is forced to refrain from transmission.
The mere act of suspending the target ECU leads to timing
misbehaviors, which can be detected by network-level timing-
based techniques. In the unlikely case where the adversary
is capable of reproducing and retransmitting all messages
originally sent by the target ECU, while respecting their
complex scheduling structure, only fingerprinting techniques
which recognize that messages are not sent by the target ECU
can detect the attack. When performing a conquest attack,
on the other hand, none of the IVN traffic characteristics is
affected (see Figure 2d). Therefore, the adversary may not only
evade detection from the state-of-the-art techniques, but also
possible safety-related protection mechanisms that monitor the
incoming traffic for faulty behaviors. In our approach, described
in the following section, we demonstrate that by monitoring
the CAN data stream at the byte level, we are able to detect
all types of attacks including the conquest attack (see Table I),
without requiring to decode and understand the payload (i.e.,
the underlying signals).
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we elucidate our attack-detection methodol-
ogy. We present a brief overview of PASAD and then highlight
the main adjustments we have introduced to develop CASAD
for in-vehicle networks. For a comprehensive treatment of
PASAD, the reader may refer to [27]. In a nutshell, with
CASAD, we aim to detect all types of attacks on IVNs described
in Section III-B by monitoring CAN traffic at the payload
level to identify structural changes attributable to malicious
payload manipulation, where we process the data fields in
the stream of frames transmitted over the CAN bus one
byte at a time. A key enabling property for CASAD is the
regularity of vehicular dynamics, which seem to follow a
pattern with military precision. Given that this regularity is
highly reflected in the CAN traffic (see Figure 3a), CASAD
lends itself to specification-agnostic detection of attacks on
IVNs. The main motivation for using CASAD is its inherent
capability of detecting slight structural changes in the payloads
by recognizing unusual byte sequences that were unseen during
training, no matter whether the individual maliciously altered
bytes fall into the normal range or not.
Detection Approach Attack TypeSusp. Fab. Masq. Conq.
LLP* [23–26] 3 3 3 7
TBS** [20, 29–31] 3 3 7 7
CASAD 3 3 3 3
TABLE I: Detection capabilities: CASAD vs. the state-of-the-art.
* Deviations in Low-Level Properties of CAN traffic (LLP).
** Deviations in Timing Behavior or Specifications of CAN traffic (TBS).
A. PASAD: Process-Aware Detection
PASAD is a model-free Process-Aware Stealthy-Attack
Detection mechanism that has recently been proposed in the
ICS domain to determine if the underlying process is drifting
from historical normal behavior by continuously monitoring
physical sensor measurements. The method is based on a time-
series analysis technique known as singular spectrum analysis,
whereby signal information representing the deterministic
behavior of the underlying dynamical system is extracted from
a time series of sensor measurements. The method takes as
input a time series T of sensor measurements and works in
two phases: an offline learning phase and an online detection
phase. In the learning phase, a subseries of the monitored
signal used for training is embedded in a vector space, referred
to as the trajectory space. Then, a signal subspace is identified
through a mathematical procedure, onto which training vectors
are projected. Owing to the regularity in the underlying system
behavior, the projected vectors form a cluster in the signal
subspace, thereby defining the normal behavior. Afterwards,
during an online detection phase, at every iteration, a test vector
is composed by incorporating the most recent sensor value. A
departure score is then iteratively computed by measuring the
distance between the most recent test vector and the centroid of
the determined cluster. Finally, an alarm is generated whenever
the score crosses a prescribed threshold.
Learning Phase. Formally, in the learning phase, an initial
subseries of T of length N is unfolded into a trajectory matrix
B = [b1 : b2 : · · · : bK ] by forming K L-lagged vectors bi,
where L is called the lag parameter, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, and K =
N − L + 1. Then, the singular value decomposition of B
is performed to obtain an orthonormal set of L eigenvectors
u1,u2, · · · ,uL of the covariance matrix BBT . A matrix U =
[u1 : u2 : · · · : ur] is then formed, whose columns are the r <
L leading eigenvectors, where r is the so-called statistical
dimension. The training vectors bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, are then
projected onto the signal subspace spanned by the column
vectors of U, and the centroid of the cluster they form is
computed as c˜ = UTc, where c is the sample mean of the
training vectors.
Detection Phase. At every iteration during the detection phase,
a departure score is computed for the most recent lagged vector
bj, j > K. This is done by computing the squared Euclidean
distance between the centroid c˜ and the most recent test vector
bj as
Dj = ||c˜−UTbj ||2. (1)
B. CASAD: CAN-Aware Detection
PASAD is not applicable to IVNs out of the box. We
have developed CASAD for in-vehicle networks by making
two important changes in PASAD: a CAN-traffic modeling
mechanism and a modified procedure for computing the
departure score.
Time series of IVN Traffic. In CASAD, the CAN traffic is
modeled as a time series T = b1, b2, · · · , bN , bN+1, · · · of (the
integer representation of) bytes extracted from the payloads of
consecutive messages, such that if the payload of a message mj
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Fig. 3: Visualization of the departure of vehicular dynamics from
normal behavior while the IVN is undergoing a masquerade attack.
on the CAN bus consists of bytes bi, bi+1, bi+2, then bi+3, bi+4
would belong to the following message mj+1 whose payload
contains only 2 bytes of data. The rationale behind processing
individual bytes is that the CAN data field, which may contain
up to 8 bytes of signal data, has a variable length, yet always
contains a multiple of one byte. Subsequently, the vectors
bi = (bi, bi+1, · · · , bi+L−1)T are composed to construct the
trajectory matrix and perform the training.
New Departure Score. Empirical evaluation on CAN traffic
showed that during the detection phase the departure scores
computed according to Eq. (1) were poorly scaled and did not
measure up to the evident departures observed by visualization
(see Figure 3b). This result may largely be attributed to the fact
that the monitored signal consists of integer values spanning
a bounded range, unlike the typical application of PASAD
on continuous real-valued sensor measurements. Therefore, in
CASAD, we determine the departure score for every test vector
by computing the squared weighted Euclidean distance from the
centroid, where the weights are determined by the ratio of each
eigenvalue to the total sum of eigenvalues associated with the
(a) CAN bus prototype (b) 2018 Volvo XC60
(c) In-car OBD connection setup
Fig. 4: Different setups used for evaluation.
r eigenvectors determined in the learning phase. Specifically,
we recompute the departure score in Eq. (1) as D˜j = ||W(c˜−
UTbj)||2 such that W is an r-dimensional diagonal matrix
whose ith diagonal entry is defined as ei/(
∑r
i ei), where ei
is the eigenvalue corresponding to the ith eigenvector ui, for
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Finally, an alarm is generated whenever D˜j ≥
θ, where θ is a prespecified threshold. Figure 3a shows a
CAN traffic generated in a simulation setting using a testbed
(see Section V-A). The initial subseries highlighted in blue
corresponds to attack-free CAN traffic used in the learning
phase to identify signal information that is representative of the
normal behavior of the underlying vehicular communication.
Once the learning phase is complete, a detection phase is
initiated, in which a departure score is computed for every new
traffic instance. The subseries of CAN traffic highlighted in
red corresponds to malicious traffic injected by the attacker
during a masquerade attack (described in Section III-B).
Aoudi et al. [27] showed that the signal subspace is isomor-
phic to a low-dimensional Euclidean space, which enables the
visualization of the projected vectors in R3. Figure 3b displays
the vectors corresponding to the CAN traffic presented in
Figure 3a after they have been projected onto the identified
signal subspace. Owing to the highly regular behavior of IVNs,
as Figure 3b depicts, the projected training vectors occupy
a firmly bounded region in the signal subspace and thereby
form a cluster. Under normal conditions, the projected test
vectors fall close to a cluster of training vectors. Under attack
conditions, on the other hand, anomalous test vectors are forced
to lie further away from the cluster and the computed distance
is presumed to increase, signaling that the IVN is departing
from the normal behavior. This attack-indicating departure from
normal behavior is expressed succinctly in Figure 3b. Aoudi
et al. [27] further introduced what they refer to as the isometry
trick to speed up the computations during the necessarily real-
time detection phase. Hence, the detection procedure is quite
fast, requiring a single matrix multiplication for every distance
computation [36].
Limitations. Notwithstanding the importance of CAN commu-
nication, which carries most of the critical signals in modern
vehicles, CASAD only handles CAN traffic to detect attacks on
IVNs, at least as far as tested. As CASAD essentially performs
spectral analysis of time series, the monitored messages also
need to be periodic or frequently transmitted over the CAN
bus, which is the case for most signals. The way CASAD
would handle non-periodic traffic depends on the type of
messages being transmitted (i.e., somewhat common event-
driven messages or very rare messages). As discussed in the
attack-free experiment in Section V-F, while driving a real
car, we intentionally emulated passenger-triggered controls
and observed that such benign activity would be gracefully
handled by CASAD. In the case of rare events (e.g., emergency
messages), CASAD may require the complementary solution
of blacklisting or whitelisting the messages for appropriate
handling. Furthermore, as CASAD monitors for changes in
behavior, it may not react promptly to attacks in which the
adversary manages to drive the vehicle to an unsafe state by
making slow normal-looking changes at the payload level (e.g.,
linearly increasing engine speed) through a conquest attack.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of CASAD, we conduct
a series of experiments on a real vehicle, a CAN bus prototype,
and CAN traffic captured from two additional vehicle brands. In
the first set of experiments, we demonstrate the capability of our
approach to detect all attacks described in this paper, including
the stealthy conquest attack. In the second set of experiments,
we examine the behavior of CASAD when performing under
attack-free conditions. We begin with a description of the
evaluation setups and the data used in validating our approach.
A. Evaluation Setup
CAN bus Prototype. As shown in Figure 4a, we build an
experimental CAN bus prototype consisting of three ECUs
that communicate on a single bus. Each ECU consists of a
SeeedStudio CAN-bus shield plugged on top of an Arduino Uno
PCB. The CAN-bus shield adopts the Microchip MCP2515 SPI,
a widely used CAN controller, and the Microchip MCP2551
CAN transceiver. The Arduino Uno is a microcontroller that
is based on the ATmega328P with a 16 MHz quartz crystal
clock, 32KB flash memory, and 2KB SRAM. ECU A was
programmed to transmit message 0x1C every 30ms, and ECU
B was programmed to transmit messages 0x01 and 0x05
every 15ms and 25ms respectively, in addition to a third ECU
(C) which was programmed to capture the CAN traffic. To
produce a realistic behavior, we simulate three messages with
transmission frequencies and payloads (i.e., signals) that are
similar to arbitrarily chosen safety-critical messages from a
2018 Volvo XC60. The CAN bus prototype was set up to
operate at 500Kbps, which is the typical bit rate for in-vehicle
high-speed CAN buses.
Real vehicle. In order to evaluate CASAD in a real-world setting
and demonstrate its capability of detecting attacks on recent
vehicles, we use a brand new 2018 Volvo XC60 (Figure 4b).
Being a test vehicle, provided by Volvo Cars for the purpose of
this research, it comes equipped with extra network interfaces,
which granted us the privilege of accessing ECUs that are
otherwise unreachable through the standard interfaces on a
released vehicle. This privilege enabled us to perform the
attacks in a much more cost-effective and time-efficient manner.
It should be noted that mounting some of the attacks without
such privileges requires extensive technical knowledge and
would be highly costly and challenging.
To communicate with the vehicle’s internal network, we
chose Vector CANoe, a widely used software for ECU
development and testing in the automotive industry, running
on a laptop, together with a Vector VN1630A CAN interface
connected to the vehicle’s OBD-II port (see Figure 4c). This
setup permitted us to create two virtual ECUs, namely E1
and E2, that were used for running CASAD and mounting
attacks respectively. To evaluate the performance of CASAD
under complex conditions in a real vehicle, we chose to
monitor one of the CAN buses on the XC60 that reflects
the vehicle dynamics. The highly loaded CAN bus that we
monitored with CASAD consists of more than five safety-critical
ECUs and a gateway that enables cross-domain communication.
Such an environment would be a highly attractive target for
attackers as it controls some major functions in the vehicle and
contains messages with high integrity requirements. There were
more than 80 CAN messages transmitted at high frequencies
between the ECUs on the bus, carrying approximately 1100
distinct signals in total. Thus, the chosen bus represents a
difficult case for detecting IVN attacks considering the scale
(a) Suspension on prototype (b) Suspension on Volvo XC60
(c) Fabrication on prototype (d) Fabrication on Volvo XC60
(e) Masquerade on prototype (f) Masquerade on Volvo XC60
Fig. 5: Detection of attacks on prototype and Volvo XC60.
and complexity of the traffic. In this setup, E1 and E2 were
practically considered as two new nodes added to the CAN bus
capable of both passively monitoring the traffic in real-time
and actively influencing the vehicle’s internal communication
by injecting crafted messages. The evaluation was performed
while the vehicle was driven on a test track. However, for safety
reasons, the vehicle was in parking mode when mounting an
attack.
Captured CAN traffic. To investigate the performance of
CASAD in the absence of attacks, in addition to testing the
method on traffic generated by the CAN bus prototype and the
real vehicle, we used CAN traffic captured from a 2012 Toyota
Corolla by Mueller et al. [37] and from a 2012 Honda Civic
by Diacon et al. [38]. The Toyota Corolla traffic consists of 58
distinct CAN messages periodically transmitted over different
frequencies ranging from 9ms to 1.06 seconds. The Honda
Civic traffic consists of 46 distinct CAN messages periodically
transmitted over different frequencies ranging from 9ms to
302ms. In both cases, the data was captured while the subject
vehicle was being driven under attack-free conditions.
B. Results Overview
In all subsequent figures, the upper subplot displays the
time series of raw CAN bytes. The part highlighted in blue
corresponds to the subseries that was used for training CASAD,
and the part highlighted in red corresponds to the time frame
during which the attack was occurring. Figures 5 and 6 display
the detection results for all four attacks. Evidently, CASAD
successfully detects misbehaviors in the CAN traffic when
the IVN is subject to all of the discussed attacks, including
the stealthy conquest attack. Figure 7 shows how, with a
proper choice of alarm threshold, CASAD triggers no false
alarms during attack-free monitoring of CAN traffic generated
from various sources. Next, we describe the experiments we
performed. For each one of the four attack scenarios discussed
in Section III, we performed the attack on the CAN bus
prototype (Figure 4a) and on a 2018 Volvo XC60 (Figure 4b).
C. The Suspension Attack Experiment
To simulate a suspension attack on the CAN bus prototype,
we programmed ECU B to stop transmitting all of its messages,
namely the ones with IDs 0x01 and 0x05, 20 seconds after
the start of the experiment. To perform the attack on the real
vehicle, we used ECU E1 to monitor the traffic on the CAN
bus, while an additional OBD-II interface in the test vehicle
was used to suspend a real (target) ECU on the bus by putting
it into programming mode 20 seconds after establishing a
diagnostic session. To observe how traffic behaves before and
after a suspension attack, we put the target ECU back online
on the bus by terminating the programming session.
As explained in Section IV, CASAD monitors the CAN
traffic at the payload level by processing one byte of traffic at
a time. Although in a suspension attack, the adversary only
suspends the target ECU and does not manipulate the payloads
of the CAN messages, CASAD still manages to detect the
attack as indicated in Figures 5a and 5b. The reason why
this attack is detectable by CASAD is that the suspension of
the target ECU leads to a change in the byte sequence such
that the subsequences monitored during the attack would be
foreign to CASAD because they were unseen during the learning
phase. This observation effectively implies that any change in
the frequency of transmission should be detectable by CASAD
because it would induce a change in the payload byte sequence.
D. The Fabrication & Masquerade Attacks
Fabrication Attacks. To evaluate CASAD against fabrication
attacks on the CAN bus prototype, we programmed ECU A to
start injecting messages with ID 0x05 at the same frequency
as its original transmitter B roughly 20 seconds after the start
of the experiment. The payload of the injected message is
identical to the original data sent by B except for the last
byte, which we assumed to represent the target signal for
the adversary. Therefore, A was programmed to change only
the last byte of the payload when injecting forged messages
with ID 0x05. To carry out the attack on the real vehicle, we
considered a scenario in which ECU E2 is fully compromised
by the adversary and used to mount a fabrication attack on a
real ECU in the vehicle. Using the proprietary signal database,
we identified the ECU that transmits Speed Limit Warning
(SLW) signals in a CAN message to the gateway ECU, which
subsequently forwards it to the dashboard ECU located in
another network domain. Ignoring the various signals that were
irrelevant to the SLW function, we located the bits in the
message payload that belong to the SLW signal; specifically,
the bits which trigger the warning and specify whether it shall
be visual, audible, or both. Finally, we programmed E2 to
initiate a fabrication attack on the SLW message.
Masquerade Attacks. To launch a masquerade attack on
the CAN bus prototype, we programmed ECU A, assumed
to be fully compromised, to launch an attack on ECU B,
assumed to be partially compromised, in which B is forcibly
withdrawn from transmission after 20 seconds, and immediately
afterwards, A starts to inject messages with ID 0x05 at the
original frequency on behalf of B, but with a maliciously crafted
payload. To perform a masquerade attack on the real vehicle,
we considered a scenario in which ECU E2, assumed to be
fully compromised by the adversary, launches a fabrication
attack on the real ECU (T) in the vehicle that is responsible for
sending the engine rotation speed (also known as Revolutions
Per Minute (RPM)) values to the dashboard ECU and a few
other receivers. For this attack scenario, we used the signal
database to identify the ECU responsible for transmitting
CAN messages containing RPM values (among other sensor
values) to the gateway ECU, which in turn relays them to
the dashboard ECU located in another network domain. We
located the bits in the message payload that belong to the RPM
signal and programmed E2 to transmit the maliciously altered
RPM message, while immediately suspending T. This was
achieved by injecting forged RPM messages from E2 having
the same ID and frequency as the original RPM message, but
with forged RPM values in the payload, while placing T into a
(a) On CAN bus prototype (b) On 2018 Volvo XC60
Fig. 6: Detection of the stealthy conquest attack.
suspension mode by sending a reprogramming request through
a diagnostic session.
In the fabrication attack scenario, the payloads corresponding
to SLW messages are maliciously altered and, as in the
suspension attack, the frequency of messages is affected as
well, since ECU A transmits the fabricated messages at a
higher frequency. As pointed out in Section III-B, when a
fabrication attack is not feasible due to the receiving ECU
having protection mechanisms in place, a masquerade attack
can be performed instead. Technically, the masquerade attack
causes similar changes in the payload byte sequence, since it
involves both altering the payload of the intended message and
suspending the target ECU. Figures 5c, 5e, 5d and 5f clearly
show how both attacks can be detected by CASAD.
E. The Conquest Attack Experiment
To simulate a stealthy conquest attack on the CAN bus proto-
type, we assumed that the target ECU B is fully compromised
by an adversary who wants to silently manipulate specific
signals in one or several messages without injecting any other
messages into the bus by any other ECUs. To perform this
attack, B was programmed to maliciously modify only the last
two bytes in the payload of messages with ID 0x05 in such a
way that the modified values remain within the normal range
of the corresponding signal.
To perform the conquest attack on the real vehicle, we
considered a scenario in which the target ECU T is fully
compromised and the adversary is capable of changing certain
bytes of the payload where one or more critical signals are
stored, while leaving the remaining data bytes intact. In this
scenario, an existing safety-critical diagnostic service (see
Section II-A) used for overwriting specific signal values on
the target ECU is identified as the launching point of the
attack. As this service is protected from unauthorized users by
the Security Access request-response protocol, an additional
OBD-II interface in the test vehicle would run the Security
Access algorithm and unlock the service on the target ECU,
while ECU E1 monitors the traffic on the CAN bus. In this
attack, the signal related to fuel consumption was maliciously
altered roughly 20 seconds after the start of the experiment.
To ensure stealthiness, we made sure that the altered values
already existed in the traffic and were repeated often enough.
Unlike existing attacks, in a conquest attack, only a relatively
small subset of payload bytes is affected, while all messages are
transmitted by their original ECUs. Importantly, the adversary
would inject the attack message using its original sender ECU
and at the original frequency. This effectively means that
the adversary is able to evade protection mechanisms, and
both timing-based and fingerprinting techniques discussed in
Section II-B, since neither the timing behavior nor the low-level
physical specifications of the messages are violated. In contrast
to the other attacks, the conquest attack causes minimal changes
in the CAN traffic. Nonetheless, as CASAD is inherently capable
of detecting slight variations in the monitored traffic, as shown
in Figure 6, it successfully detects the conquest attack both on
the CAN-bus prototype and the real vehicle. The significance
of this result particularly lies in CASAD’s distinctive capability
of detecting subtle anomalous deviations in a small fraction
of signal data bytes on a heavily loaded CAN bus containing
more than 1100 distinct signals, and without prior knowledge
of the underlying signal specifications.
F. The Attack-Free Experiment
To simulate normal traffic behavior on the CAN bus
prototype, we programmed ECUs A and B to transmit messages
0x1C and [0x01,0x05] respectively. For the sake of producing
a realistic behavior, the payloads of the messages were
constructed to be similar to that of existing messages on the
Volvo XC60 CAN bus. In order to investigate the performance
of CASAD under normal driving conditions, the test vehicle was
driven in an urban area, where unforeseen events and ambient
conditions required the driver to show different reactions
(sudden acceleration, braking, etc.), thus adding normal, yet
significant, variability to the IVN traffic, which was passively
monitored by E1 throughout the experiment. Finally, in order to
demonstrate the applicability of our approach to other vehicle
brands, we ran CASAD on normal CAN traffic captured from
a 2012 Toyota Corolla and a 2012 Honda Civic.
Figure 7 shows the behavior of CASAD when performing
on normal traffic generated by the CAN prototype and three
different real vehicles. In particular, the CAN traffic displayed
in Figure 7b was captured while driving the Volvo XC60 test
(a) CAN bus prototype (b) 2018 Volvo XC60
(c) 2012 Toyota Corolla (d) 2012 Honda Civic
Fig. 7: Evaluation of CASAD on attack-free CAN traffic.
(a) Repeated masquerade attacks
(b) Identifying the best threshold
Fig. 8: Optimizing the detection delay/false alarms trade-off.
vehicle in an urban area and, as indicated in the figure, no
false alarms were triggered by CASAD. In order to determine
the alarm threshold for these experiments, we followed the
same methodology adopted in [27], where we ran CASAD on
a validation subseries of CAN traffic (highlighted in green),
selected to be twice as long as the training subseries, and then
defined the threshold to be slightly higher than the maximum
departure score attained during the validation period. A more
rigorous choice of threshold is described next.
G. Quantitative Analysis & Best Threshold
As demonstrated by the previous experiments, CASAD can
detect attacks on IVNs with maximum accuracy and without
triggering any false alarms. Therefore, we do not evaluate
CASAD’s performance using traditional classification metrics
such as ROC curves. However, one important metric for
evaluating CASAD’s performance is the average time it takes
to detect an attack, which we refer to as the delay factor.
Evidently, setting the alarm threshold high enough so as to
avoid false positives results in a larger delay factor. More
precisely, the delay factor, denoted by δL,θ, varies with the
lag parameter L and is inversely proportional to the alarm
threshold θL,r for a fixed choice of L and r.
We define the delay factor as the number of traffic instances
(bytes) that fall into the aggregate of attack intervals Ta and
whose corresponding departure scores are below the threshold,
normalized by the total number of attack instances γa. More
formally, δL,θ =
∣∣ {Ti | i ∈ Ta, D˜i < θ} ∣∣ / γa.
Figure 8a shows CAN traffic from an IVN that was subject
to 10 repeated masquerade attacks. To discover the best
alarm threshold, for k different values of the lag parameter
L, we determine the corresponding statistical dimension r,
and compute δL,θ for 1, 000 different values of θ selected by
evenly dividing the range between the minimum and maximum
departure scores attained throughout the entire experiment.
As illustrated in Figure 8b, this procedure yields k curves
describing the trade-off between the time to detection and the
likelihood of false positives for different choices of CASAD’s
lag parameter. The task then is to optimize this trade-off
by determining the best delay factor δL∗,θ∗ . Intuitively, the
best lag parameter L∗ should correspond to the curve with
the minimum AUC, which measures the total detection delay
over the different threshold trials. After identifying the best
curve as such, we determine the best threshold θ∗ by visually
identifying the optimal cut corresponding to the threshold that
minimizes the delay factor while maximizing the threshold,
where the latter is equivalent to minimizing the likelihood of
false positives. The approach to determining the alarm threshold
mentioned in Section V-F is naive and not very tolerant to
changes in system dynamics. By contrast, as shown in Figure 8a,
the described procedure results in a more sensible choice of
threshold that decreases the sensitivity to false alarms while
maintaining prompt detection of attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, IVNs have witnessed a rapid increase
in the number of cyberattacks, raising concerns about the safety
of passengers. With CAN being the most prevalent protocol
used for safety-critical applications in vehicles, designing
intrusion detection systems for CAN communication has
become a major area of interest. This paper has made several
noteworthy contributions to the field of automotive security.
First, we have presented CASAD, an efficient attack-detection
mechanism that is particularly suitable for the IVN domain.
Second, we have introduced the truly stealthy conquest attack
with potential to cause serious impact on vehicles. Third, we
have demonstrated, through extensive experiments including
performing attacks on a 2018 Volvo XC60 test vehicle, how
unlike existing methods, CASAD is capable of detecting stealthy
attacks on IVNs. Finally, we have shown that CASAD enjoys
the advantage of being specification-agnostic, which makes it
applicable to a wide range of vehicle models and deployable
in real-world settings.
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